David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (2006)
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this volume, the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
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|Call number||BD591.P78 2006|
|ISBN(s)||0521184398 052185959X 9780521859592|
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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Brenner (forthcoming). What Do We Mean When We Ask “Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?". Erkenntnis:1-18.
Christopher M. P. Tomaszewski (forthcoming). The Principle of Sufficient Reason Defended: There Is No Conjunction of All Contingently True Propositions. Philosophia:1-8.
Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (2015). Without Reason? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
Tyron Goldschmidt (2011). The New Cosmological Argument: O'Connor on Ultimate Explanation. Philosophia 39 (2):267-288.
C’Zar Bernstein (2014). Giving the Ontological Argument Its Due. Philosophia 42 (3):665-679.
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