|Abstract||Dogmatism is a claim about a possible epistemic position, not about the metaphysics of what puts us in that position. So, for example, it leaves it open whether the intrinsic nature of a perceiving subject’s state is the same as that of a hallucinating subject’s state.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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