Hyper-Evaluativity
| Abstract | Predicates are "hyper-evaluative" when they depend on more than just the semantic values (be they intensional or more fine-grained) of their individual arguments, but also on the way those arguments are "coordinated" or "wired." I examine motivations and semantic implementations for such predicates, drawing from linguistics and computer science. | |||||||||
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Owen McLeod (2001). Science, Religion, and Hyper-Humeanism. Philo 4 (1):68-81.
Ned Block (1993). Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality. Mind and Language 8 (1):1-26.
James Pryor (2006). Hyper-Reliability and Apriority. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.
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A. Ferrara (2012). Hyper-Pluralism and the Multivariate Democratic Polity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (4-5):435-444.
Raymond D. Boisvert (2011). The Fall. International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4):467-482.
Bashshar Haydar (2003). The Moral Relevance of Cost. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):127 - 134.
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