Graduate studies at Western
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344 (2006)
|Abstract||I argue that beliefs that are true whenever held-like I exist, I am thinking about myself, and (in an object-dependent framework) Jack = Jack-needn't on that account be a priori. It does however seem possible to remove the existential commitment from the last example, to get a belief that is knowable a priori. I discuss some difficulties concerning how to do that|
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