What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?

Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349-378 (2004)
Abstract
Consider the following well-worn example, first put forward by Fred Dretske. You’re at the zoo, and in the pen in front of you is a striped horse-like animal. The sign on the pen says “Zebra.” Assuming that animal really is a zebra, it would seem that your evidence is perfectly adequate to enable you to know that it’s a zebra. So you know.
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Tim Black (2008). Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
Martin Smith (2013). Entitlement and Evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.

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