Philosophical Issues 14:349-378 (2004)
|Abstract||Consider the following well-worn example, first put forward by Fred Dretske. You’re at the zoo, and in the pen in front of you is a striped horse-like animal. The sign on the pen says “Zebra.” Assuming that animal really is a zebra, it would seem that your evidence is perfectly adequate to enable you to know that it’s a zebra. So you know.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Philip A. Ebert (2005). Transmission of Warrant-Failure and the Notion of Epistemic Analyticity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):505 – 521.
Martin Smith (2009). Transmission Failure Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.
Annalisa Coliva (2010). Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.
Jake Chandler (2012). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
Nicholas Silins (2005). Transmission Failure Failure. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71 - 102.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Luca Moretti (2012). Wright, Okasha and Chandler on Transmission Failure. Synthese 184 (3):217-234.
Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza (forthcoming). When Warrant Transmits and When It Doesn't: Towards a General Framework. Synthese.
Annalisa Coliva (2012). Varieties of Failure (of Warrant Transmission: What Else?!). Synthese 189 (2):235-254.
Chris Tucker (2010). When Transmission Fails. Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads92 ( #7,394 of 551,007 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,450 of 551,007 )
How can I increase my downloads?