More on hyper-reliability and a priority
| Abstract | In section III of Pryor 2006a, I argued against the view that the mere fact that a thought- type is hyper-reliable directly gives one justification to believe a thought of that type. A close alternative says that our merely appreciating that the thought-type is hyper-reliable directly gives us that justification. | |||||||||
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