David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism (2013)
We have several intuitive paradigms of defeating evidence. For example, let E be the fact that Ernie tells me that the notorious pet Precious is a bird. This supports the premise F, that Precious can fly. However, Orna gives me *opposing* evidence. She says that Precious (the same Precious) is a dog. Alternatively, defeating evidence might not oppose Ernie's testimony in that direct way. There might be other ways for it to weaken the support that Ernie's testimony gives me for believing F, without the new evidence itself intuitively constituting reasons to believe one way or the other about Precious's flight ability. An example: <span class='Hi'>Ursula</span> tells me that Ernie has no idea what Precious's species is; he's just guessing. She may not herself want to or be in a position to weigh in about Precious's real species or flight ability. I call defeating evidence of this sort *undermining evidence.
|Keywords||undermining immediate justification|
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Citations of this work BETA
David James Barnett (2014). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
Nicholas Silins (2014). The Agony of Defeat? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):505-532.
Jonathan Weisberg (forthcoming). You’Ve Come a Long Way, Bayesians. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-18.
Giacomo Melis (2014). Understanding Undermining Defeat. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):433-442.
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