David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378 (2004)
Something about this argument sounds funny. As we’ll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. Iwill assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but Iwon’t. I’ll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore’s argument using Contextualist machinery. They’ll say.
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
John Turri (2010). On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Elijah Chudnoff (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
Alex Worsnip (2015). The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
David James Barnett (2016). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
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