David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S13-S24 (2001)
This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker realist position. (It has been recently advocated by Worrall, French, and Ladyman.) This paper unravels and criticizes the metaphysical presuppositions of both paths to SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive-and viable-realist thesis
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Citations of this work BETA
Luciano Floridi (2007). A Defence of Informational Structural Realism. Synthese 161 (2):219 - 253.
Steven French (2010). The Interdependence of Structure, Objects and Dependence. Synthese 175 (S1):89 - 109.
Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis (2011). Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
Stathis Psillos (2006). The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure? Philosophy of Science 73 (5):560-570.
Francesco Berto & Jacopo Tagliabue (2014). The World is Either Digital or Analogue. Synthese 191 (3):481-497.
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