David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):137-156 (2006)
In the present paper, I offer a conceptual argument against the view that all properties are pure powers. I claim that thinking of all properties as pure powers leads to a regress. The regress, I argue, can be solved only if non-powers are admitted. The kernel of my thesis is that any attempt to answer the title question in an informative way will undermine a pure-power view of properties. In particular, I focus my critique on recent arguments in favour of pure powers by the Late George Molnar and Jennifer McKitrick. The lines of defence of the friends of powers converge on what I call 'the ultimate argument for powers', viz., that current physics entails (or supports) the view that the fundamental properties (spin, mass, charge) are ungrounded powers. I take issue with this argument and make a modest suggestion: that the evidence from current physics is inconclusive
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References found in this work BETA
B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
John Heil (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
George Molnar (2003). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Citations of this work BETA
Travis Dumsday (forthcoming). Atoms Vs. Extended Simples: Towards a Dispositionalist Reconciliation. Philosophia:1-11.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Dispositions and the Argument From Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71 - 90.
Travis Dumsday (2015). Why Pan-Dispositionalism is Incompatible with Metaphysical Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):107-122.
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