What is General Philosophy of Science?

The very idea of a general philosophy of science relies on the assumption that there is this thing called science—as opposed to the various individual sciences. In this programmatic piece I make a case for the claim that general philosophy of science is the philosophy of science in general or science as such. Part of my narrative makes use of history, for two reasons. First, general philosophy of science is itself characterised by an intellectual tradition which aimed to develop a coherent philosophical view of science, qua a part of culture with distinctive epistemic features and a distinctive relation to reality. But, second, this tradition went through some important conceptual shifts which re-oriented it and made it more sensitive to the actual development of science itself. The historical narrative focuses on three such moments: the defining moment, associated with Aristotle, and two major conceptual turns, related to Kant and Duhem. The pressures on the very idea of a general philosophy of science that followed the collapse of the macro-models of science that became popular in the 1960s, the pressures that lay all of the emphasis on fragmentation and not on integration, can be dealt with by a new synthesis within general philosophy of science of the constitutive and the historical, in light of the intellectual tradition that has defined it.
Keywords Philosophy of science  History of science  Unity  Aristotle  Duhem  Kant
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Ernst Cassirer (1950). The Problem of Knowledge. New Haven, Yale University Press.
    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Klaus Fischer (1995). Braucht Die Wissenschaft Eine Theorie? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (2):227 - 257.
    John Wettersten (2005). Popper's Historical Role: Innovative Dissident. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (1):119 - 133.

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    54 ( #24,523 of 1,088,370 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    5 ( #19,987 of 1,088,370 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.