Emotional consciousness: A neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience
Graduate studies at Western
Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):811-834 (2008)
|Abstract||This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory explains numerous phenomena concerning emotional consciousness, including diﬀerentiation, integration, intensity, valence, and change. Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard D. R. Lane & K. McRae (2004). Neural Substrates of Conscious Emotional Experience: A Cognitive-Neuroscientific Perspective. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
Richard D. R. Lane (2000). Neural Correlates of Conscious Emotional Experience. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel, G. L. Ahern, J. Allen & Alfred W. Kaszniak (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
Timo Järvilehto (2001). Feeling as Knowing--Part II: Emotion, Consciousness and Brain Activity. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):75-102.
Paul Thagard & Terrence C. Stewart (2011). The AHA! Experience: Creativity Through Emergent Binding in Neural Networks. Cognitive Science 35 (1):1-33.
Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin (2003). How Conscious Experience and Working Memory Interact. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):166-172.
Kathryn E. Patten (2011). The Somatic Appraisal Model of Affect: Paradigm for Educational Neuroscience and Neuropedagogy. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (1):87-97.
Max Velmans (ed.) (1996). The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. Routledge.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1998). The Disunity of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
Stuart R. Hameroff (1998). More Neural Than Thou (Reply to Churchland). In S. Ameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Ii: The 1996 Tucson Discussions and Debates. Mit Press.
Melvyn A. Goodale & K. Murphy (2000). Space in the Brain: Different Neural Substrates for Allocentric and Egocentric Frames of Reference. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads7 ( #142,372 of 739,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,303 )
How can I increase my downloads?