Brown and Berkeley

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):177-180 (2007)
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Abstract

For J. Brown the essential feature of thought experiments is that they mobilize our intuition; the way they teach positive lessons to cognizers is by means of the intuition mobilized. The paper presents a problem for Brown with the help of a famous TE as counterexample. It argues that Berkeley’s master argument is a philosophical thought experiment that lacks a feature typical of platonic thought experiments -- intuitive grasp. If Berkeley’s argument is a thought experiment,as I’ve attempted to show, then we have a counterexample to Brown’s view that thought experiments are not arguments.

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Thought Experiments.Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James R. Brown - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 25 (1):135-142.

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