David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 126 (1-2):221 - 259 (2001)
The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither deflationary nor substantive.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In particular, it is shown that generally an objectual ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting objects (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of primary states of affairs. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ross P. Cameron (2010). How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264.
Brian Ellis (1988). Internal Realism. Synthese 76 (3):409 - 434.
Hans-Johann Glock (2002). Does Ontology Exist? Philosophy 77 (2):235-260.
Gregory Lavers (2004). Carnap, Semantics and Ontology. Erkenntnis 60 (3):295-316.
David Kaufman (2000). Correlations, Constellations and the Truth: Adorno's Ontology of Redemption. Philosophy and Social Criticism 26 (5):62-80.
Thomas Hofweber (1999). Ontology and Objectivity. Dissertation, Stanford University
Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truth and Fundamentality: On Merricks's Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Books 49 (4):302-316.
Chris Brink & Ingrid Rewitzky (2002). Three Dual Ontologies. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):543-568.
James D. Rissler (2006). Does Armstrong Need States of Affairs? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):193 – 209.
Trenton Merricks (2007). Truth and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #40,823 of 1,012,676 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,295 of 1,012,676 )
How can I increase my downloads?