David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 27:585-600 (2002)
This paper examines Hutcheson’s moral sense theory’s attack on internalism and his defense of an innovative version of externalism. I show that Hutcheson’s distinction between exciting and justifying reasons supports a type of externalist theory not anticipated by Brink, Smith, or McDowell. In Moral Sense Externalism, moral judgment relies upon the perceptions of a moral sense, and the felt quality of these perceptions introduces to judgment an affective dimension. Thus feeling is a constituitive part of what it is to have a justifying reason for a moral act even when it is not the direct motive to action
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John J. Tilley (2012). Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
Noriaki Iwasa (2013). On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism. Prolegomena 12 (1):61-82.
Robert Lockie (1998). What's Wrong with Moral Internalism. Ratio 11 (1):14–36.
Philip Stratton-Lake (1999). Why Externalism is Not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):77–90.
Sergio Tenenbaum (2011). Externalism, Motivation, and Moral Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press
Caj Strandberg (2007). Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation. Philosophia 35 (2):249-260.
Nick Zangwill (2003). Externalist Moral Motivation. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):143-154.
Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund (2013). Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions? Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335.
Patricia Sheridan (2007). The Metaphysical Morality of Francis Hutcheson: A Consideration of Hutcheson's Critique of Moral Fitness Theory. Sophia 46 (3):263-275.
Noriaki Iwasa (2011). Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (33):323-352.
Noriaki Iwasa (2010). Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs. Prolegomena 9 (2):271-286.
Sergio Tenenbaum (2000). Ethical Internalism and Glaucon's Question. Noûs 34 (1):108–130.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads16 ( #154,465 of 1,700,365 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #62,577 of 1,700,365 )
How can I increase my downloads?