Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth

Faith and Philosophy 5 (2):185-192 (1988)
Abstract In this paper I will show that the omnitemporality of truth does indeed imply fatalism if the past is unchangeable. I then argue that it is very likely indeed that the past is unchangeable and thus, since it is very likely that fatalism is false, it is very likely that the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth is false. I argue that the rejection of the omnitemporality of truth has no undesirable consequences for either logic or theology, that in fact the logical and theological consequences of the rejection of the omnitemporality of truth are beneficial to both disciplines
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