Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):120-140 (2013)
|Abstract||Frege supposedly believes that vague predicates have no referent or Bedeutung. But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism|
|Keywords||Frege Vagueness Ordinary Language|
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