David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):319-346 (2013)
Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities.
|Keywords||Leibniz color sensible qualities qualities subjectivism objectivism physicalism secondary qualities|
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References found in this work BETA
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Bertrand Russell (1912/2004). The Problems of Philosophy. Barnes & Noble Books.
Robert Merrihew Adams (1994). Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford University Press.
Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.) (1997). Readings on Color I: The Philosophy of Color. The MIT Press.
Margaret D. Wilson (1987). Berkeley on the Mind-Dependence of Colors. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (3/4):249.
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