Austin on some problems of perception
Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):18-22 (1965)
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| Keywords | Epistemology Hallucination Illusion Mind Perception Austin | |||||||||
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J. Barry Maund (1976). The Non-Sensuous Epistemic Account of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):57-62.
Aaron Allen Schiller (2012). The Primacy of Fact Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593.
A. J. Ayer (1967). Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory? Synthese 17 (June):117-140.
Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (1982). Perception, Illusion, and Hallucination. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (2):159-191.
Michael Thau (2004). What is Disjunctivism? Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):193-253.
Vander Veer & L. Garrett (1964). Austin on Perception. Review of Metaphysics 17 (June):557-567.
Roderick Firth (1964). Austin and the Argument From Illusion. Philosophical Review 73 (July):372-382.
W. F. R. Hardie (1963). Austin on Perception. Philosophy 38 (July):253-263.
Robert Schwartz (2004). To Austin or Not to Austin, That's the Disjunction. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):255-263.
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