Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence

Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):295-315 (2012)
One can have no prior credence whatsoever (not even zero) in a temporally indexical claim. This fact saves the principle of conditionalization from potential counterexample and undermines the Elga and Arntzenius/Dorr arguments for the thirder position and Lewis' argument for the halfer position on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, thereby supporting the double-halfer position.
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DOI jphil2012109411
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Alastair Wilson (2013). Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axt018.
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