Kitcher on tradition-independent a priori warrant

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):373-376 (2002)
Abstract
In his most recent treatment of a priori knowledge, Philip Kitcher argues against what he takes to be the widespread view that our knowledge and warranted belief is 'tradition-independent'. Furthermore, he argues that defeasible conceptions of a priori warrant entail that it is not tradition-independent, a conclusion which he thinks is contrary to what most epistemologists hold. I argue that knowledge is not widely believed to be tradition-independent, and that, while warrant is widely believed to be tradition-independent, Kitcher's arguments show neither that this widespread view is mistaken nor that it conflicts with defeasible a warrant. I conjecture that Kitcher may be misled by a lack of clarity regarding the analysandum designated by 'warrant'.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Albert Casullo (1988). Revisability, Reliabilism, and a Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):187-213.
    Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
    Philip Kitcher (1980). A Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Review 89 (1):3-23.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Albert Casullo (2009). Analyzing a Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):77 - 90.
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