Biology and Philosophy 19 (5):765-779 (2004)
|Abstract||I have recently argued that origin essentialism regarding individual organisms entails that natural selection does not explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do. This paper defends this and related theses against Mohan Matthen's recent objections.|
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