Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan

Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501 (2013)
Abstract
Terence Horgan defends the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem, claiming that Beauty can, upon awakening during the experiment, engage in “synchronic Bayesian updating” on her knowledge that she is awake now in order to justify a 1/3 credence in heads. In a previous paper, I objected that epistemic probabilities are equivalent to rational degrees of belief given a possible epistemic situation and so the probability of Beauty’s indexical knowledge that she is awake now is necessarily 1, precluding such updating. In response, Horgan maintains that the probability claims in his argument are to be taken, not as claims about possible rational degrees of belief, but rather as claims about “quantitative degrees of evidential support.” This paper argues that the most plausible account of quantitative degree of support, when conjoined with any of the three major accounts of indexical thought in such a way as to plausibly constrain rational credence, contradicts essential elements of Horgan’s argument
Keywords Sleeping Beauty problem  Logical probability  Epistemic probability  Indexical knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,825
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.

View all 25 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Brian Weatherson (2013). Ross on Sleeping Beauty. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):503-512.
Kai Draper (2008). Sleeping Beauty's Evidence. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):61 - 70.
Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, Quite Contrary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):103-22.
Alastair Wilson (2013). Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axt018.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-03-04

Total downloads

73 ( #20,626 of 1,100,089 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #90,379 of 1,100,089 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.