Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):392-393 (1995)
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Abstract

Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.

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10.1017/s0140525x00039091

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Joel Pust
University of Delaware

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References found in this work

Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.Peter Strawson - 1959 - London, England: Routledge. Edited by Wenfang Wang.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Garden City, N.Y.: Routledge.
The Structure of scientific theories.Frederick Suppe (ed.) - 1974 - Urbana,: University of Illinois Press.

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