Analysis 60 (1):51–57 (2000)
|Abstract||Alvin Plantinga theorizes about an epistemic property he calls "warrant," defined as that which makes the difference "between knowledge and mere true belief." I show that, given this account, Plantinga can have no justification for claiming that a false belief is warranted nor for claiming that warrant comes in degrees.|
|Keywords||Warrant Plantinga, A|
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