Warrant and analysis

Analysis 60 (1):51–57 (2000)
Alvin Plantinga theorizes about an epistemic property he calls "warrant," defined as that which makes the difference "between knowledge and mere true belief." I show that, given this account, Plantinga can have no justification for claiming that a false belief is warranted nor for claiming that warrant comes in degrees.
Keywords Warrant  Plantinga, A
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00202
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Andrew M. Bailey (2010). Warrant is Unique. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.

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