Fodor and Block on narrow content
In Representation and Reality. MIT Press (1987)
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Frederick R. Adams (1993). Fodor's Modal Argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
Martin Davies (1986). Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83.
Stephen P. Stich (1991). Narrow Content Meets Fat Syntax. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
Kam-Yuen Cheng (2002). Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
Frederick Adams (1993). Reply to Russow. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
Ned Block (1995). An Argument for Holism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:151-70.
P. S. Kitcher (1985). Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism. Philosophy of Science 52 (March):78-97.
Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58.
Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1990). Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly. Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.
Ned Block (1991). What Narrow Content is Not. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
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