David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):2 – 16 (2001)
This paper responds to Stroud's important The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. The author defends a view in which statements in a natural language have truth-evaluable content only in concrete contexts. It is argued that just what counts as a concrete possibility that must be defeated before one can say that one knows something is a highly context-sensitive matter, and that Stroud's alternative to this context-sensitive account of the way the verb "know" functions seems to be either a semantics in which knowledge claims (about the "external world") are trivially logically false or no intelligible semantics at all.
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Martin Montminy (2010). Two Contextualist Fallacies. Synthese 173 (3):317 - 333.
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