Truth, activation vectors and possession conditions for concepts
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):431-447 (1992)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | Epistemology Functionalism Reality Representation Churchland, P Peacocke, C | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Christopher Peacocke (1996). Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):433-460.
John Campbell (1985). Possession of Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85:149-170.
Christopher Peacocke (1989). Possession Conditions: A Focal Point for Theories of Concepts. Mind and Language 4 (1-2):51-56.
Wayne A. Davis (2008). Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions. Acta Analytica 23 (3):207-231.
Neil Tennant (2002). The Emperor's New Concepts. Noûs 36 (16):345-377.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation (Christopher Peacocke). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Concepts and Epistemic Individuation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
Paul M. Churchland (1992). Activation Vectors Versus Propositional Attitudes: How the Brain Represents Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads20 ( #61,503 of 549,067 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,067 )How can I increase my downloads? |

