International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (1):17 – 29 (2008)
|Abstract||This paper argues for the view that moral realism is irrelevant to ethics. It recalls Aristotle's claim that the Platonic Form of the Good is irrelevant because it is not the sort of thing we can desire or pursue. Moore's account of ethics in relation to conduct and of the Ideal is woefully inadequate as a morality to live by. Peter Railton's moral realism also involves a very weak first-order moral theory. These failures are due, I claim, to the fact that Plato, Moore and Railton regard morality as a science; it is not a science, it is an art.|
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