Computational models and empirical constraints

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1):98-128 (1978)
Abstract
It is argued that the traditional distinction between artificial intelligence and cognitive simulation amounts to little more than a difference in style of research - a different ordering in goal priorities and different methodological allegiances. Both enterprises are constrained by empirical considerations and both are directed at understanding classes of tasks that are defined by essentially psychological criteria. Because of the different ordering of priorities, however, they occasionally take somewhat different stands on such issues as the power/generality trade-off and on the relevance of the sort of data collected in experimental psychology laboratories
Keywords artificial intelligence   cognition   cognitive science   methodology   empirical constraints   computer simulation
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John Haugeland (1979). Author's Response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):634-635.

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