David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365 (2000)
Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge, and utilities in determining the function it computes – in other words, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early vision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this claim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related potentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of vision.
|Keywords||categorical perception cognitive penetration context effects early vision expert perception knowledge-based vision modularity of vision natural constraints “new look” in vision perceptual learning signal detection theory stages of vision top-down processes visual agnosia visual attention visual processing|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Siegel (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
Dustin Stokes (2012). Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
Wayne Wu (2013). Visual Spatial Constancy and Modularity: Does Intention Penetrate Vision? Philosophical Studies 165 (2):647-669.
Shaun Gallagher & Somogy Varga (2014). Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. Topoi 33 (1):185-199.
Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545.
Similar books and articles
Cathleen M. Moore (1999). Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision Does Not Imply Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):385-386.
Philippe G. Schyns (1999). The Case for Cognitive Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.
Andrew Hollingworth & John M. Henderson (1999). Vision and Cognition: Drawing the Line. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):380-381.
Mary A. Peterson (1999). Knowledge and Intention Can Penetrate Early Vision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):389-390.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
Zenon Pylyshyn (1999). Vision and Cognition: How Do They Connect? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):401-414.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads89 ( #43,996 of 1,790,308 )
Recent downloads (6 months)19 ( #42,243 of 1,790,308 )
How can I increase my downloads?