David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognition 80 (1-2):127-158 (2001)
This paper argues that a theory of situated vision, suited for the dual purposes of object recognition and the control of action, will have to provide something more than a system that constructs a conceptual representation from visual stimuli: it will also need to provide a special kind of direct (preconceptual, unmediated) connection between elements of a visual representation and certain elements in the world. Like natural language demonstratives (such as `this' or `that') this direct connection allows entities to be referred to without being categorized or conceptualized. Several reasons are given for why we need such a preconcep- tual mechanism which individuates and keeps track of several individual objects in the world. One is that early vision must pick out and compute the relation among several individual objects while ignoring their properties. Another is that incrementally computing and updating representations of a dynamic scene requires keeping track of token individuals despite changes in their properties or locations. It is then noted that a mechanism meeting these requirements has already been proposed in order to account for a number of disparate empiri- cal phenomena, including subitizing, search-subset selection and multiple object tracking (Pylyshyn et al., Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 48(2) (1994) 260). This mechanism, called a visual index or FINST, is brie
|Keywords||attention externalism object-files objects perception nonconceptual content|
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Citations of this work BETA
Mathieu Le Corre & Susan Carey (2007). One, Two, Three, Four, Nothing More: An Investigation of the Conceptual Sources of the Verbal Counting Principles. Cognition 105 (2):395-438.
Brian Scholl (2001). Objects and Attention: The State of the Art. Cognition 80 (1-2):1-46.
Susan Carey & Fei Xu (2001). Infants' Knowledge of Objects: Beyond Object Files and Object Tracking. Cognition 80 (1-2):179-213.
Michael Murez & François Recanati (2016). Mental Files: An Introduction. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):265-281.
Lance J. Rips, Amber Bloomfield & Jennifer Asmuth (2008). From Numerical Concepts to Concepts of Number. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):623-642.
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