Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):617-618 (2003)
|Abstract||The distinction between such differing approaches to cognition as connectionism and rule-based models is paralleled by a distinction between two basic modes of cognition postulated in the so-called dual-process theories. Integrating these theories with insights from hybrid systems might help solve the dilemma of combining the demands of evolutionary plausibility and computational universality. No single approach alone can achieve this.|
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