Interpretive Charity, Massive Disagreement, and Imagination

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):49-74 (1999)
Abstract
I argue that it is a main theme of Davidson's theory of interpretation that interpretive charity implies the impossibility of massive disagreement. There is clear textual support for that. I then argue that from the first-person point of view of a full-blooded interpreter, the theme must be accepted; and that is precisely why Davidson accepts it. If massive disagreement between speaker and interpreter seems to us easy to imagine, it is only because the imagination involved is third-personal and not full-blooded.
Keywords D. Davidson  epistemology
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