Wittgenstein's Reconsideration of the Transcendental Problem — With Some Remarks on the Relation between Wittgenstein's "Phenomenology" and Husserl's Phenomenology

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):123 - 138 (2008)
Abstract
The transcendental problem that obsessed the great Western philosophers such as Kant and Husserl should be, according to Wittgenstein, conceived as a matter of understanding a process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from stated rules. Once these rules, regarded as a priori categories by Kant and as eidos and eidetic relations by Husserl, are demonstrated to be no more than the language usages or rules of language-games related to our forms of life, Kant's transcendental idealism and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology no longer have a leg to stand on. /// 按照维特根斯坦的看法,迷住象康德和胡塞尔那样的西方伟大哲学家的先验 问题,应该被设想为是一个如何理解根据所述规则进行推论得出必然结论的问题。 一旦这些被康德认为是先天范畴、被胡塞尔认为是本质和本质关系的规则被证明为 元非是与生活形式相关的语言的用法或语言游戏的规则时,康德的先验唯心主义和 胡塞尔的先验现象学就不再站得住脚。.
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