The parity view and intuitions of neutrality

Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):107-114 (2007)
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Abstract

One response to Derek Parfit's invokes the relation of . Since parity is a form of in John Broome's terms, three doubts which Broome raises about accounts involving incommensurateness in Weighing Lives pose a challenge for this response. I discuss two of these. They emerge from a discussion of various intuitions about . I argue that an account based on parity may be no less consistent with Broome's intuitions than is his own vagueness view

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Citations of this work

On parity and the intuition of neutrality.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):87-108.
What does incommensurability tell us about agency?Luke Elson - 2021 - In Henrik Andersson & Anders Herlitz (eds.), Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk. And Decision-Making. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 181-198.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Parity, interval value, and choice.Ruth Chang - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):331-350.

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