David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):13-40 (2003)
The philosophical innateness debate has long relied onpsychological evidence. For a century, however, a parallel debate hastaken place within neuroscience. In this paper, I consider theimplications of this neuroscience debate for the philosophicalinnateness debate. By combining the tools of theoretical neurobiologyand learning theory, I introduce the ``problem of development'' that alladaptive systems must solve, and suggest how responses to this problemcan demarcate a number of innateness proposals. From this perspective, Isuggest that the majority of natural systems are in fact innate. Lastly,I consider the acquistion strategies implemented by the human brain andsuggest that there is a rigorous way of characterizing these ``neuralconstructivist'' strategies as not being strongly innate. Alternatives toinnateness are thus both rigorously definable and empirically supported.
|Keywords||Brain Innateness Learning Neural Science|
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Victoria McGeer (2007). Why Neuroscience Matters to Cognitive Neuropsychology. Synthese 159 (3):347 - 371.
Gert Westermann, Sylvain Sirois, Thomas R. Shultz & Denis Mareschal (2006). Modeling Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):227-232.
John Sarnecki (2007). Developmental Objections to Evolutionary Modularity. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):529-546.
Robert A. Wilson (2004). What Computations Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):407-425.
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