Progress as a demarcation criterion for the sciences

Philosophy of Science 41 (2):154-170 (1974)
Abstract
It is argued that two aspects of the progress of mature science characterize, at least in combination, no other fields; hence, that these aspects can usefully serve as a demarcation criterion. Scientific progress is: (1) cumulative, regardless of crisis or revolution, from the viewpoint of concrete applications; (2) capable of unrestricted growth towards universal coerciveness of argument and evidence. Before these aspects of progress are discussed, some clarifications are made and corrections offered to Kuhn's view of the nature of scientific progress across revolutions; afterwards, the suggested criterion is used to distinguish, concretely, various fields from science. Finally, it is shown that the "style" of scientific progress is not a useful demarcation criterion
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    Ilkka Niiniluoto, Scientific Progress. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Ulrich Charpa (1986). Philologischer Fortschritt. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 17 (2):229-255.
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