PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:355 - 358 (1986)
|Abstract||These comments address two of the main topics discussed by Laudan. First I take issue with the correctness-conditions and the acceptability-conditions he proposes for methodological rules. Then I criticize his suggestion about how to naturalize the axiology of scientific inquiry. I note that the realizability of a goal is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of its worthiness of pursuit, and I argue that this leaves room for conventional choice of scientific goals. In concluding, I respond to Laudan's attacks on Feyerabend, Polanyi, Popper, Lakatos and Quine by saying a few words in their defense.|
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