David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43 (1951)
Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism
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Michael Huemer (forthcoming). A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
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Justin Biddle (2013). State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
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