The Roots of Reference

Lasalle, Ill.,Open Court (1974)
Abstract
Our only channel of information about the world is the impact of external forces on our sensory surfaces. So says science itself. There is no clairvoyance. How, then, can we have parlayed this meager sensory input into a full-blown scientific theory of the world? This is itself a scientific question. The pursuit of it, with free use of scientific theory, is what I call naturalized epistemology. The Roots of Reference falls within that domain. Its more specific concern, within that domain, is reference to concrete and abstract objects: what such reference consists in, and how we achieve it.
Keywords Reference  Perception  Language and languages Philosophy  Naturalized epistemology  Set theory
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Call number B105.R25.Q56
ISBN(s) 8120833651
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    Citations of this work BETA
    David Manley (2009). When Best Theories Go Bad. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):392-405.
    Gary Kemp (2010). Quine: The Challenge of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):283-295.
    T. Parent (2008). Quine and Logical Truth. Erkenntnis 68 (1):103 - 112.
    Brian Weatherson (2003). Are You a Sim? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):425–431.
    Alex Byrne (2007). Soames on Quine and Davidson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 135 (3):439 - 449.

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