The Roots of Reference

Lasalle, Ill.,Open Court (1974)
Our only channel of information about the world is the impact of external forces on our sensory surfaces. So says science itself. There is no clairvoyance. How, then, can we have parlayed this meager sensory input into a full-blown scientific theory of the world? This is itself a scientific question. The pursuit of it, with free use of scientific theory, is what I call naturalized epistemology. The Roots of Reference falls within that domain. Its more specific concern, within that domain, is reference to concrete and abstract objects: what such reference consists in, and how we achieve it.
Keywords Reference  Perception  Language and languages Philosophy  Naturalized epistemology  Set theory
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Call number B105.R25.Q56
ISBN(s) 8120833651  
DOI 10.2307/2025215
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Byeong-Uk Yi (2005). The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part I. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):459-506.
Harold W. Noonan (2015). Relative Identity. Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):52-71.
Christopher Peacocke (1993). How Are A Priori Truths Possible? European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.

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