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  • Panu Raatikainen, Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences.
    The issue of downward causation (and mental causation in particular), and the exclusion problem is discussed by taking into account some recent advances in the philosophy of science. The problem is viewed from the perspective of the new interventionist theory of causation developed by Woodward. It is argued that from this viewpoint, a higher-level (e.g., mental) state can sometimes truly be causally relevant, and moreover, that the underlying physical state which realizes it may fail to be such.
    Mental Causation, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
    Downward Causation in Metaphysics
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 116.9Panu Raatikainen, Mental Causation, Interventions, and Contrasts.
    The problem of mental causation is discussed by taking into account some recent developments in the philosophy of science. The problem is viewed from the perspective of the new interventionist theory of causation developed by Woodward. The import of the idea that causal claims involve contrastive classes in mental causation is also discussed. It is argued that mental causation is much less a problem than it has appeared to be.
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 100.3John L. Tienson (2002). Higher-Order Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):89-101.
    We have a familiar idea of levels of description or levels of theory in science: microphysics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the various social sciences. It is clear that philosophers - such as Terry Horgan - who want to be nonreductive materialists with regard to the mental must hold that this is not mere description; there must be genuine higher-level causes, and hence, genuine higher-level properties, in particular mental properties and causes. But there appears to be a deep problem (...) concerning mental causes. The (micro-) physical world is causally closed. Mental states are - or depend on or are realized by - physical states. It seems, then, that the physical state on which a mental state depends will be responsible for any alleged effects of the mental state. There will be no room for mental causation. And if properties exist insofar at they have a causal role, there will be no room for mental properties either. Many philosophers - Horgan included - have seen this problem of the "causalexclusion" ofthe mental as a specialcase of a general problem:the exclusion of higher-level causes by the causal closure of microphysics. Suppose one higher-level state, H1 leads to another higher-level state, H2. H1 is realized by some base level state, B1, which leads to a base-level state, B2, which in turn realizes H2. All of the casual work, so to speak, takes place at the base level. There is no room for any genuine causal connection between H1, as such, and H2, as such. I argue that there is no problem about higher-order causation in general. There are genuine, unsurprising higher-level causes and properties. A ball roles, for example, or breaks a window. If there is a problem of exclusion regarding putative mental causes, it is not an instance of a general exclusion problem, but is sui generis, and mental causation remains mysterious. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 99.7Brad Weslake, Exclusion Excluded.
    I argue that an independently attractive account of causation and causal explanation provides a principled resolution of the exclusion problem.
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
    Causal Overdetermination in Metaphysics
    Causal Closure of the Physical in Metaphysics
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  • 94.8 Istv (2008). Excluding Exclusion: The Natural(Istic) Dualist Approach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67 – 78.
    The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism - its form, commitments, and intuitions - makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event (...) causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise. (shrink)
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  • 94.4István Aranyosi (2008). Excluding Exclusion: The Natural(Istic) Dualist Approach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67-78.
    The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism --its form, commitments, and intuitions?makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to (...) which events are medium-grained, namely, parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 89.7Janez Bregant (2004). Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited. Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
    The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...) beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept. (shrink)
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 88.6James Ladyman (2008). Structural Realism and the Relationship Between the Special Sciences and Physics. Philosophy of Science 75 (5).
    The primacy of physics generates a philosophical problem that the naturalist must solve in order to be entitled to an egalitarian acceptance of the ontological commitments he or she inherits from the special sciences and fundamental physics. The problem is the generalized causal exclusion argument. If there is no genuine causation in the domains of the special sciences but only in fundamental physics then there are grounds for doubting the existence of macroscopic objects and properties, or at least the concreteness (...) of them. The aim of this paper is to show that the causal exclusion problem derives its force from a false dichotomy between Humeanism about causation and a notion of productive or generative causation based on a defunct model of the physical world. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd., Bristol BS8 1TB, UK. (shrink)
    Structural Realism in General Philosophy of Science
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  • 87.4James Woodward (2008). Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    This paper discusses some issues concerning the relationship between the mental and the physical, including the so-called causal exclusion argument, within the framework of a broadly interventionist approach to causation.
    Causal Closure of the Physical in Metaphysics
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  • 87.4Peter Menzies & Christian List (forthcoming). The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences. In Cynthia Mcdonald & Graham Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence and Causation.
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 86.9Larry Shapiro, Lessons From Causal Exclusion.
    “Let us now turn to an argument designed to show that mind-body supervenience itself leads to apparent difficulties with mental causation,” says Kim (1998: 39). This is something of a reversal, for Kim (1984: 103) had earlier argued that supervenient causation is a legitimate form of causation. I prefer Kim’s earlier way of thinking. The problem that Kim, in his more recent writings, sees emerging from supervenience is that of causal exclusion. But I think that supervenience by itself does not (...) entail causal exclusion. Belief that it does betrays a metaphysical prejudice that some empirically-informed reflection may help remove. In this paper I take an empirical perspective toward Kim’s arguments for causal exclusion and conclude that, from this perspective, supervenience does not have the dire consequences for causal explanation in the specials sciences that Kim thinks it does. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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