Conceptions of truth in intuitionism

History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):131--45 (2004)
Abstract
Intuitionism’s disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular.
Keywords Realism-essay
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Mihai Ganea (2008). Epistemic Optimism. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353.
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