Conceptions of truth in intuitionism

History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):131--45 (2004)
Intuitionism’s disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular.
Keywords Realism-essay
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DOI 10.1080/014453401625669
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References found in this work BETA
Dag Prawitz (1994). Meaning Theory and Anti-Realism. In Brian McGuiness & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Kluwer 79--89.

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Mihai Ganea (2008). Epistemic Optimism. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353.

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