Exploring Randomness
Notices of the AMS 48 (9):992-6 (2001)
| Abstract | In the early twentieth century two extremely influential research programs aimed to establish solid foundations for mathematics with the help of new formal logic. The logicism of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell claimed that all mathematics can be shown to be reducible to logic. David Hilbert and his school in turn intended to demonstrate, using logical formalization, that the use of infinistic, set-theoretical methods in mathematics—viewed with suspicion by many—can never lead to finitistically meaningful but false statements and is thus safe. This came to be known as Hilbert’s program. | |||||||||
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Volker Peckhaus (1995). Hilberts Logik. Von der Axiomatik Zur Beweistheorie. NTM International Journal of History and Ethics of Natural Sciences, Technology and Medicine 3 (1):65-86.
Stewart Shapiro (2005). Categories, Structures, and the Frege-Hilbert Controversy: The Status of Meta-Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 13 (1):61-77.
C. S. Calude & G. J. Chaitin (1999). Randomness Everywhere. Nature 400:319-320.
José Ferreirós (2009). Hilbert, Logicism, and Mathematical Existence. Synthese 170 (1):33 - 70.
Patricia Blanchette, The Frege-Hilbert Controversy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wilfried Sieg (1999). Hilbert's Programs: 1917-1922. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):1-44.
Paolo Mancosu (1999). Between Russell and Hilbert: Behmann on the Foundations of Mathematics. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5 (3):303-330.
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