On Horwich's way out

Analysis 65 (287):175-177 (2005)
Abstract
The minimalist view of truth endorsed by Paul Horwich denies that truth has any underlying nature. According to minimalism, the truth predicate ‘exists solely for the sake of a certain logical need’; ‘the function of the truth predicate is to enable the explicit formulation of schematic generalizations’. Horwich proposes that all there really is to truth follows from the equivalence schema: The proposition that p is true iff p, or, using Horwich’s notation, ·pÒ is true ´ p. The (unproblematic) instances of the schema form ‘the minimal theory of truth’. Horwich claims that all the facts involving truth can be explained on the basis of the minimal theory. However, it has been pointed out, e.g. by Gupta (1993), that the minimal theory is too weak to entail any general facts about truth, e.g. the fact that..
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References found in this work BETA
A. Gupta (1993). A Critique of Deflationism. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.
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Similar books and articles
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Paul Horwich (2001). A Defense of Minimalism. Synthese 126 (1-2):149 - 165.
Dirk Greimann (2000). Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 (1):133-155.
John Collins (2002). Horwich's Sting. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):213-228.
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