On knowing what one does

Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1):251-283 (2006)
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Abstract

You can see me doing this or that. And your seeing me doing this or that is the source, or even the form, of your knowing what I am doing. As well as the source, or the form, of my knowing what you are doing might be my seeing you doing this or that. However, it would be strange to say that one is looking for what one is doing in order to know it. Nevertheless, it would also be strange to say that one does not know what one is doing when one is doing this or that. So, what is the source, or even the form, of one's knowledge of what one is doing, given that one knows what one is doing? Or is there something strange about this being an assumption? When, then, do we say that one knows, and then also: that one does not know, what one is doing?

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Richard Raatzsch
EBS Universität Für Wirtschaft Und Recht

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