Philosophy of Science 32 (January):57-72 (1965)
|Abstract||"Of Minds and Molecules" attempts to show the difficulties in mental-state brain-state monism. By exploring the differences in meaning between mental-state sentences and brain-state sentences, and by analysing the implications of the theory of the molecular composition of matter, a kind of dualism is arrived at that no scientist should feel uncomfortable with. It is a dualism without mental substance but it does not deprive mental states of their uniqueness. Arguments are given for the propriety of asserting causal connections and dependency relations between mental states and molecular states of the brain|
|Keywords||Brain Processes Dualism Identity Identity Theory Mental States Monism Science|
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