Putnam, languages and worlds
Dialectica 55 (2):167–174 (2001)
| Abstract | The key argument of Hilary Putnam for conceptual relativism, his so-called mereological argument, is critically evaluated. It is argued that Putnam’s reasoning is based on confusion between languages and theories. | |||||||||
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Jeffery L. Johnson (1991). Making Noises in Counterpoint or Chorus: Putnam's Rejection of Relativism. Erkenntnis 34 (3):323--45.
Mathias Frisch (1999). Van Fraassen's Dissolution of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument. Philosophy of Science 66 (1):158-164.
Hilary Putnam (1994). Comments and Replies. In Peter Clark & Bob Hale (eds.), Reading Putnam. Blackwell.
Christopher Norris (2002). Hilary Putnam: Realism, Reason, and the Uses of Uncertainty. Distributed in the U.S. By Palgrave.
David Liggins (2008). Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
D. C. Smith (2003). What is so Magical About a Theory of Intrinsic Intentionality? Philosophical Papers 32 (1):83-96.
Damian Cox (2003). Goodman and Putnam on the Making of Worlds. Erkenntnis 58 (1):33 - 46.
Jürgen Dümont (1999). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (2):341-364.
Panu Raatikainen (2003). More on Putnam and Tarski. Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
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