Ramsification and inductive inference

Synthese 187 (2):569-577 (2012)
Abstract
An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.
Keywords Ramsey sentences  Realism  Inductive inference  Structuralism
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References found in this work BETA
Peter M. Ainsworth (2009). Newman's Objection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):135-171.
Pierre Cruse (2005). Ramsey Sentences, Structural Realism and Trivial Realization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (3):557-576.

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John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
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Jeffrey Ketland (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
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