Graduate studies at Western
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94 (2009)
|Abstract||This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the 'fitting attitudes' analysis of value.|
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